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Australasian environmental economics:
contributions, conﬂicts and ‘cop-outs’∗
Jeff Bennett†
Australian and New Zealand environmental economists have played a signiﬁcant role in
the development of concepts and their application across three ﬁelds within their sub-
discipline: non-market valuation, institutional economics and bioeconomic modelling.
These contributions have been spurred on by debates within and outside the discipline.
Much of the controversy has centred on the validity of valuations generated through
the application of stated preference methods such as contingent valuation. Suggestions
to overcome some shortcomings in the work of environmental economists include the
commissioning of a sequence of non-market valuation studies to ﬁll existing gaps to
improve the potential for beneﬁt transfer.
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1. Context
TheemergenceofenvironmentaleconomicsinAustraliaandNewZealandhasreﬂected
growing public interest in and heightened political debate over environmental issues
including the ﬂooding of Lake Pedder in Tasmania, logging of old growth forests,
salinisation of farmland and waterways and the restoration of environmental river
ﬂows.
To begin a consideration of Australasian environmental economics, two deﬁnitional
matters require resolution: ﬁrst, what is environmental economics as distinct from
other areas of the economics discipline and second, what distinguishes Australian and
New Zealand environmental economics from international developments?
Environmental economics can be deﬁned very broadly. The approach taken in this
paper is to consider environmental economics in a more restricted way by excluding
developments in the economics of natural resources, apart from when the analysis
involves trade-offs between the exploitation of natural resources and impacts on the
ecosystem. For instance, the consideration of the optimal rate of extraction of a non-
renewable resource of a mineral or the optimal rotation length of a plantation forest is
considered in this paper to be outside the realm of environmental economics (and part
of resource economics) until such considerations involve environmental externalities
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suchaspollutionduetominetailingsandbiodiversityprotectioninoldgrowthforests,
respectively. Hence, what is looked for here is an impact – negative or positive – on the
natural environment.
Australasian environmental economics has developed mostly from studies in agri-
cultural and resource settings. For example, many of the so-called ‘green’ issues of
Australasian environmental economics have centred on microeconomic trade-offs be-
tween extractive agricultural enterprises and the condition of the environment. Such
trade-offs include water being allocated between irrigated agriculture and environ-
mental ﬂows in rivers and the clearing of remnant vegetation for pastures or crops
as opposed to protecting it as a source of biodiversity. Similarly, ‘brown’ issues have
focused on resource development concerns such as mine site rehabilitation and the
environmental impacts of mineral processing.
This focus of Australian and New Zealand environmental economics on issues
associated with agriculture and resources has seen the journal of this Society, the
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics (AJARE) – and before it,
the Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics (AJAE) and the Review of Marketing
and Agricultural Economics (RMAE) – assume the mantle as the prime repository for
the Australasian environmental economics knowledge base.
It is within this context that this paper is set. The ﬁrst goal is to provide a viewpoint
on Australasian environmental economics by examining the contributions made, the
conﬂicts that have emerged both within and outside the subdiscipline and the short-
comings or ‘cop-outs’ of the profession. This viewpoint draws on material published
in the AJARE, AJAE and RMAE; however, it will be necessarily supplemented when
discussing omissions and conﬂicts. The time frame of this review is the past 20years;
chosenprimarilyforpersonalreasonsinthatmyﬁrstcontributiontothisliteraturewas
published in 1984. The second goal is to provide some thoughts on future issues that
may face the Australian and New Zealand environmental economics profession.
2. Contributions




A key feature of environmental economics is the consideration of resource use choices
that have impacts on environmental assets that are not bought and sold in markets.
For economists to say much about such choices within the framework of neoclassical
welfare economics, requires an ability to estimate non-market environmental beneﬁts
or costs involved in monetary terms. The challenge to provide such estimates accu-
rately has been a primary focus of local and international environmental economics
(Adamowicz 2004).
Two broad types of NMV techniques have been developed: those that rely on the
preferences of people for environmental goods and services being revealed in related
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markets and those that involve people stating their preferences in structured ques-
tionnaires. Australasian contributions in both categories have helped develop these
techniques through innovative applications and explorations of their controversial
aspects.
The revealed preference technique that has received attention in the Australasian
contextisthetravelcostmethod(Beal1995;ChotikapanichandGrifﬁth1998;Kennedy
1998; Common et al. 1999). Two stated preference techniques have been developed
and debated: the contingent valuation (CV) method and choice modelling (CM). The
validity of estimates derived from these techniques has been a major focus of the
studies undertaken. Studies by Bennett (1984) and Sinden (1988) were supportive of
the use of CV. Bennett and Carter (1993) were more circumspect in their conclusions
following their analysis of CV data collected in the context of alternative management
strategies for the forests of south-east Australia and Blamey et al. (1995) were critical
of the technique. They argued that respondents to CV questions were likely to act as
‘citizens’ rather than ‘consumers’ and that this voided the use of CV-derived values
in comparisons with market-derived values. Rolfe and Bennett (1996) disputed the
distinction made between citizen and consumer viewpoints and a later study by Curtis
and McConnell (2002) revisited the issue by presenting empirical evidence to dispute
the Blamey et al. hypothesis.
The criticism of CV by Blamey et al. was part of an international questioning of
thetechnique,largelybroughtonbythedebatesurroundingtheuseofCVtodetermine
the compensation to be paid for damage caused to the environment following the
Exxon Valdez oil spill. This debate was mirrored in Australia by arguments regarding
the use of CV to estimate the costs of environmental damage expected from mining
Coronation Hill, adjacent to Kakadu National Park.
The controversy spawned limited further development of the technique in Australa-
sia, with two further studies being published in the Society’s journals to date (Bennett
et al. 1998; Kerr 2000). The debate was one impetus for the development of CM.
Since 1999, the AJARE has featured a number of CM applications. Blamey et al.
(1999) estimated the environmental costs associated with the expansion of Canberra’s
water supply. Several other studies in different settings followed (Blamey et al. 2000;
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin 2001; Rolfe et al. 2002; Morrison and Bennett 2004;
Van Bueren and Bennett 2004).
A feature of these studies has been attempts to validate the estimates derived.
For instance, Rolfe et al. (2002) looked for a priori expected framing effects in their
results. Morrison and Bennett (2004) considered the strength of an econometric model
explaining respondents’ choices as validation. These efforts reﬂected the scepticism
held by some members of the profession and policy-makers/advisors regarding stated
preference results.
In overview, the contribution made to the NMV literature has been signiﬁcant with
more attention being paid to the development of stated preference techniques rather
than revealed preference techniques. This balance of effort is different from the one
evidentinthebroaderinternationalliterature(Adamowicz2004)whererelativelymore
attention has been given to revealed preference techniques such as hedonic pricing and
the production function approach. In addition, relatively more focus has been given
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to CM in the Australasian literature compared with the international literature where
CV has been more heavily applied. Between 1984 and 1993, four NMV papers were
published in the AJAE compared to 15 papers in the past decade.
2.2 Institutional economics
The analysis of institutions that provide incentives for the provision of environmen-
tal goods and services has formed another focus for Australasian environmental
economists. Recognising that many environmental issues arise because existing rules
governing human behaviour do not provide incentives for the optimal allocation of
resources, the profession has looked for alternatives. Traditional analyses of ‘market
failures’ that give rise to suboptimal allocation of environmental resources have given
waytotheconsiderationofthereasonswhymarketshavenotformedforthistypeofre-
source and what measures may allow markets to form, or what alternative institutions
may be installed to see Pareto improvements in allocations.
A key focus within this issue has been property rights with recurrent applications in
the contexts of land degradation, notably dryland salinity and water. Quiggin (1986)
drewattentiontothedistinctionbetweencommonpropertyandopenaccessresources,
arguingthatbymistakenlyequatingthetwoinstitutionalarrangements,policy-makers
had ignored the prospects of using the vesting of rights over environmental assets to
groups as an alternative to both atomistic ownership (private property rights) and
no ownership (open access). Although Quiggin recognised the difﬁculties associated
with the coordination of groups once the numbers increased, he did not examine the
problemsofinformationaboutindividuals’preferencesorthebiophysicalrelationships
between causes and effects. In the case of dryland salinity, this information is critical
to the deﬁnition and defence of property rights, be they common property or private,
because without it, property essentially becomes open access.
Wills (1987) examined this information problem noting the signiﬁcance of transac-
tion costs in addressing questions about resource use where impacts on environmental
assets are apparent. As well as noting that resource use decisions should include the
costs of securing the desired resource use outcomes, Wills speciﬁcally linked resource
supply and use incentives facing individuals to the property rights regime installed.
Wills (1992) returned to this theme by introducing the concept of institutional settings
providing ‘signals’ to resource suppliers and users. The contributions made by both
Quiggin and Wills were synthesised in Marshall et al.’s (1996) paper on integrated
catchment management.
Further institutional developments in the context of water were made by Brennan
and Scoccimarro (1999) and Crase et al. (2000). Both papers investigated the prospects
of alternative property rights regimes for the allocation of water between extractive
uses such as irrigated agriculture and environmental ﬂows. Brennan and Scoccimarro
advocated formalised rights for environmental ﬂows so that ‘in-stream’ ﬂows could
be traded. Crase et al., however, were more sceptical about the prospects of trade to
achieveenvironmentalgoals.TheycitedQuiggin’s(1986)concernsregardingtheappar-
ent conﬂict between making water entitlements more secure to facilitate the efﬁcient
use of the water resource through trade and the uncertainty about what levels of
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environmental ﬂows will meet community demands. Some empirical evidence cen-
tring on the lack of permanent trades in water entitlements was used to justify their
argument.
Quiggin (2001) revisited his earlier theme of advocating a common property ap-
proach to water resources in the Murray–Darling Basin by incorporating transaction
costs into his analysis. Yet in the following year, Bell (2002) called for the introduc-
tion of trading houses for water entitlements for environmental ﬂows, maintaining an
alignment with a private property right approach.
Althoughthecommonpropertyapproachtowaterrightswasbeingdebated,Pannell
(2001) and Pannell et al. (2001) raised the issue in the context of dryland salinity. They
questioned the effectiveness of common property-based initiatives such as Landcare
andintegratedcatchmentmanagementinachievingdrylandsalinityoutcomes.Pannell
(2001) argued that property rights-based solutions such as market-based instruments
would be inefﬁcient because the salinity reduction beneﬁts they generate are likely to
be less than the costs of the payments made by government. Instead he advocated a
combination of a more geographically targeted public response, including engineering
works,andthedevelopmentoffarmenterprisesthatwouldbebothproﬁtableandhave
positive dryland salinity outcomes. Also, Pannell et al. (2001) questioned the relevance
of salinity as an externality in the Western Australian context noting that the actions
of individual farmers often result in salinity consequences for themselves alone.
The conceptual institutional analysis changed focus with the publication of ﬁndings
from the BushTender trial (Stoneham et al. 2003; Strappazzon et al. 2003). In this
trial, the Victorian Government purchased rights to remnant vegetation stands on
private property. A feature was the ‘collectivisation’ of the demand side for remnant
vegetation. That is, landowners were asked to sell the protection of native vegetation
on their lands (by accepting payment for protection works such as fencing to exclude
stock) to the government who acted as a ‘representative’ of the public’s demand for the
environmental beneﬁts offered by the protected native vegetation.
A further minor theme running through the institutional economics aspect of Aus-
tralasian environmental economics considered the role of government as the buyer of
environmental ‘public goods’. Its earliest expression was in Kingwell (1994), where the
potential for trading in Australian native species of birds was explored: the transaction
costs associated with differentiating between wild birds and those bred in captivity
(and hence the costs associated with deﬁning the property right to the birds) could be
reduced through the use of genetic labelling. This point was also pursued by Bennett
(1995) who questioned the clarity of the distinction made between private and public
goods when it came to the beneﬁts of natural ecosystem protection. He argued that the
prospects of private ownership or management of protected natural areas should be
explored in cases where the public good aspects of nature protection can be supplied
as joint products of privately supplied areas.
Clarke (2000) added a dimension by pointing out that the additional transac-
tion costs associated with bird migrations across international boundaries reduces
the prospects for private trade achieving species conservation.
The contribution made by Australasian environmental economists through the ap-
plication of institutional economic principles has been evident in the development of
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environment/natural resource policy over the past 20years. The Landcare movement
and integrated catchment management were reﬂections of the common property argu-
ments put forward by the profession. The subsequent redirection of policy toward a
private property rights-based approach, as evident in the development of water mar-
kets, initiatives such as the BushTender scheme and the growth in private sector nature
conservationenterprisessuchasAustralianBushHeritage,canbeseenasaresponseto
the difﬁculties, including ‘free-rider’ problems, associated with the common property
approach. They are also a response to a growing recognition of the incentive problems
inherent in regulatory responses to resource use problems.
Anderson (2004) succinctly outlines the public and common property difﬁculties.
His advocacy for a private property-based system of environmental resource alloca-
tion, however, fails to deal adequately with cases where transaction costs preclude the
establishment of a market but where collective action has the potential to lower those
costs.
The challenge remains to develop a policy response that combines the strengths
of the regulatory, common property and private property approaches. The extent of
the contribution made under the title of institutional economics has expanded over
time. From 1984 to 1994, only three papers were published on the topic in AJAE.
Subsequently, over a dozen papers have appeared.
2.3 Bioeconomic modelling
By seeking to explain and predict cause and effect relationships in ecosystems and
then to investigate the economic consequences of those relationships, bioeconomic
modelling seeks to tackle a component of the information problem described in the
previous subsection. The contribution by Australasian environmental economists has
variedfromrelativelystraightforwardconsiderationsofthecostsofalternativeresource
use strategies to complex integrations of biophysical models of ecological and farming
systemswithsocialcost–beneﬁtanalysesandpolicyadvice.Thecommondenominator
ofthisaspectofenvironmentaleconomicshasbeenanattempttolinktheenvironment
to some aspect of economic performance.
The most basic form of bioeconomic modelling involves the estimation of opportu-
nity costs arising from an environmental issue. Sinden and Jones (1985) considered the
issue of eucalyptus dieback in the New England region, demonstrating that addressing
the decline of the tree population would cause land owners ﬁnancial costs not only
through the direct ﬁnancial costs of tree planting and protecting existing trees but also
in reduced land productivity.
More sophisticated modelling was used by Alaouze and Fitzpatrick (1989) in their
analysis of investment options to reduce salinity in the Murray–Darling Basin. Using
mixed integer linear programming, they sought to identify the combination of salinity
reducing investments that would achieve a speciﬁed goal while minimising the net
present value of costs. Biophysical links were drawn between each investment and
its impact on salinity. The economic modelling involved aggregate cost minimisation.
They concluded that their approach offered signiﬁcant advantages over standard cost–
beneﬁt analysis but overlooked salinity reduction beneﬁts. Their bioeconomic model
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presented was, therefore, more of a cost-effectiveness analysis designed to achieve a
predetermined – and apparently arbitrarily deﬁned – level of salinity reduction.
The omission of estimates relating to environmental impacts also occurs in Pass-
more and Browns’ (1991) consideration of environmental consequences of rangeland
management in Queensland. They used stochastic dynamic programming to analyse
optimal stocking rates under varying conditions, demonstrating that graziers would
risk the degradation that comes with higher stocking rates in response to higher wool
prices, increased discount rates and lower property size. Greiner (1996) used a different
perspective by analysing the costs caused to landowners by increasing levels of dryland
salinity. Gretton and Salma (1997) note that on-farm consequences of land degrada-
tion are both positive and negative. That is, proﬁtable enterprises can have negative
on-farm repercussions. Yet Gretton and Salma recognised how the adaptive behaviour
of farmers could alter some of these negative consequences.
All of these bioeconomic modelling studies focus on cost aspects of environmental
change. They also account only for on-farm impacts. For instance, typically these
studies consider the costs of an environmental change, say dryland salinity, in terms
of reduced crop yields or additional drainage expenses but they ignore social costs
such as the increased probability that an endangered species will become extinct due
to habitat loss.
Mallawaarachchi and Quiggin (2001) made some way toward addressing these lim-
itations. In their analysis of land use change in sugar regions along the Queensland
coast, they integrated choice-modelling-derived estimates of the values of different
types of remnant vegetation with farm proﬁt estimates in a geographical information
system to recommend socially preferable land use combinations. Hence, a cost–beneﬁt
framework was built into the bioeconomic modelling process, with environmental im-
pacts being explicitly recognised through a CM module, and policy recommendations
being an end product.
The ﬂexibility of the bioeconomic modelling has been demonstrated by research
conducted by Heaney et al. (2001) on water salinity, Cacho et al. (2001) on dryland
salinitycontrolandCachoetal.(2003)oncarbonsequestrationopportunities.Cassells
and Meister (2001) demonstrated the potential for using Computable General Equi-
librium modelling in costing the New Zealand dairy industry’s response to national
water quality standards.
Some key points emerge regarding the contribution of bioeconomic modelling to
environmental economics. First, it can be applied in a wide variety of contexts ranging
fromfarm-leveltonationalperspectivesandfromspeciﬁclocalenvironmentalissuesto
global issues like climate change. Yet there remains a misconception that bioeconomic
modelscanprovidealltheinformationnecessaryforapolicychoice.Althoughitistrue
that some modelling studies offer a range of policy insights (e.g., Mallawaarachchi and
Quiggin 2001) most only consider single aspects of policy choices. Many studies ignore
non-market environmental beneﬁts or costs. In a sense then, what these bioeconomic
models offer are estimates of threshold ﬁnancial values against which policy-makers
can judge the extent of non-monetary values.
The growth in the contribution made under the heading of bioeconomic modelling
has not been as sharp as with the other categories of environmental economics treated
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in this paper. However, increases in the level of sophistication and the scope of analysis
have featured.
3. Conﬂicts
Contributions of Australasian environmental economists have been wide-ranging and
somehavebeenattheforefrontofboththedevelopmentofthinkingontheseissuesand
their adaptation for use. The extent of the contributions is also increasing. Whereas in
the 1980s the norm was for each volume of this journal to contain one environmental
economics-based paper, in the 2000s it has been the case that a paper featuring envi-
ronmental economics has appeared on average in each issue. On this basis it can be
concluded that Australasian environmental economics is alive and well. But over the
course of the past 20years, numerous controversies have arisen.
Atonelevel,theseconﬂictshavepresentedthreatstotheadvancementofthesubdis-
cipline. But at another, they have provided the pressure for the subdiscipline to evolve
faster and for its products to be more robust to intellectual challenge. The conﬂicts
mostly have not been Australasian-speciﬁc but have been part of international debates.
There has been debate between those in the discipline who adhere to a neoclassical
basis for their analyses and those who question the relevance of the assumptions that
underpin the neoclassical framework when dealing with environmental issues. The
latter have generally grouped under the banner of ecological economists. This is a
deﬁnition of ecological economics that differs from that promulgated by Harrison
and Tisdell (1994) who reserve the label for those undertaking studies deﬁned here as
bioeconomic modelling. Differences between the two ‘schools of thought’ centre on
concernsofthoseadheringtotheneoclassicalframeworkaboutthe‘breaches’madeby
ecological economists. For instance, some ecological economists object to the concept
of trade-offs accepted by neoclassicists in instances when they have a prior objection
perhaps on ethical grounds to a potential outcome.
Other concerns about the use of economics to consider environmental issues have
arisen from outside the profession and have been the subject of some conﬂict. Exam-
plesoftheconcernsandtherefutationsbymembersoftheprofessioninclude:Cutbush
(1995), ‘mandatory recycling is good for the environment’; Brunton (1995), ‘we must
adopt a risk averse approach and always err on the side of caution when dealing
with environmental issues’; and Rolfe (1995b), ‘the ethical imperative of intergenera-
tional equity requires us to place ecological considerations, such as the conservation
of biological diversity, ahead of other matters’.
In the remainder of this section, some of the speciﬁcally Australian conﬂicts are
detailed under the same three subheadings used to document the contributions.
3.1 Non-market valuation
The conﬂicts surrounding the development of NMV techniques have been to the
fore of environmental economics in Australia and New Zealand for the past 20years.
First, there has been an ongoing debate within the profession as to the validity of
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estimates arising from both revealed preference and stated preference techniques.
Second, questions regarding the use of NMV techniques have been raised from lobby-
ists, policy-advisors and policy-makers who are non-economists.
The debate in the AJAE regarding responses to CV questionnaires between Blamey
et al. (1995) and Rolfe and Bennett (1996) was one dimension of a much larger debate.
The Blamey et al. criticism related to a fundamental issue of whether or not responses
were consistent with neoclassical principles underpinning welfare economics. This line
of argument provided a positivist dimension to views advanced by lobby groups that
placing monetary values on environmental impacts was inappropriate.
Other positivist concerns were focused more on the accuracy of the estimates. The
extent of bias arising from the hypothetical nature of questions and the potential for
strategic bias were at the forefront and gave rise to the hypotheses tested by Sinden
(1988). The conﬂict over a CV study for the Coronation Hill mining inquiry was
perhaps the climax of this debate (see Bennett 1996).
The criticism of CV gave heightened impetus to the development of CM as an alter-
native stated preference technique with superior bias prevention properties. However,
the CV validity debate has enveloped CM and affected environmental policy-making.
The controversial nature of stated preference techniques has been one cause for
policy-advisers to be cautious in commissioning such studies as inputs into the devel-
opment of policies with environmental impacts. In addition, being able to question the
usefulness or validity of adding environmental value estimates to a cost–beneﬁt anal-
ysis provides decision-makers and lobbyists with more degrees of freedom to pursue
rents in the decision-making process. Without environmental value estimates, thresh-
olds provided by market-based economic assessments must be compared subjectively
to assessments of non-market values.
This has opened the door to decision-making frameworks other than cost–beneﬁt
analysis. Alaouze and Fitzpatrick (1989), for example, advocate a mathematical
programing-based cost-effectiveness analysis. Another contender is multicriteria anal-
ysis (MCA). Because MCA requires resource use impacts to be estimated in a diversity
of metrics, it avoids the cost–beneﬁt analysis requirement of environmental, non-
market impacts to be estimated in monetary terms. The problem with this approach,
however, is that at some stage the trade-off between the various impacts is required.
Usually, ‘weights’ are applied to the individual impacts before they are subjected to
theaggregationprocess.Theseweightsareanexpressionofpreferencesacrossimpacts.
In MCA, the most common way for these weights to be determined is subjectively by
either the analyst or the decision-maker, and that can open the process to rent-seeking
behaviour.
The debate regarding the validity of non-market value estimates has not been re-
strictedtostatedpreferencetechniques.Oneofthemostwidelyusedrevealedpreference
techniques, the travel cost method, was also the subject of conﬂict. The debate was on
two levels: the capacity of the technique to deliver estimates that are conceptually valid
(Common et al. 1999) and technical issues regarding application (Chotikapanich and
Grifﬁths 1998). This debate appears to have made less of an impact on policy-making
than the stated preference conﬂict.
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3.2 Institutional economics
The debate dominating the institutional economics arena of environmental economics
has centred on the policy prospects offered by various rights regimes: private prop-
erty, common property and government regulation. The decade of Landcare can be
viewed as an expression of the view that the common property model is the most ap-
propriate regime for the management of environmental assets that involve individual
non-excludability but for which jointness of supply does not apply. The point made
is that the transaction costs of excluding individual users if ownership is vested in an
individual (i.e., private property) are greater than the transaction costs associated with
monitoring group use under a common property rights regime. In other words, the
group, through relatively cheap anti-free-riding strategies, can secure exclusion. Sim-
ilarly, integrated catchment management relies on incentives introduced from within
the group charged with responsibility for the catchment.
Community-based management of environmental resources received substantial
government support particularly through payments made under the Natural Heritage
Trust fund. The effectiveness of this regime was questioned for (at least) two reasons.
First, the funds were spread so thinly across the nation’s environmental problems that
tangible beneﬁts were difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Second, difﬁculties were experienced in main-
taining community interest in achieving project goals. Even with government funding,
individuals were still required to make private inputs. The incentive to make these pri-
vate investments to secure community-wide gains waned when only a small subgroup
of volunteers consistently made the private contributions. Free-riding behaviour was
not helped by government initiatives to employ Landcare coordinators. Because these
people were being paid by the government to undertake what had been voluntary
activities, the incentive to volunteer was further reduced.
Atthesametimeasthesedifﬁcultieswerebeingfacedundercommonpropertyman-
agement regimes, new initiatives were being taken to promote private property-based
regimes. Market-based instruments were advanced as providing stronger incentives for
environmental goal achievement. Water provides a good example, with the separation
of water entitlements from land title. Setting caps on extractions and hence the ﬁxing
of ‘environmental ﬂows’ has been the process to meet environmental demands.
Two points are salient. First, there is dispute over the use of the private property
regime for the allocation of water extractions. Although those in favour argue that the
security of well-deﬁned rights is critical to the efﬁciency of the industries dependent
on the water (Freebairn 2005), those against suggest that the uncertainty of the level
of demand for environmental uses is such that rights should be held in common with
allocations between differing demands from within the community being adjusted
given prevailing demand conditions (Tan 2005).
Second, the current situation involves some water rights being held effectively by
the state through its setting of caps and environmental ﬂow levels. In some states these
ﬂow levels have been set in consultation with the community and may be thought of
as de facto common property. In others, the process of determination is more ‘top-
down’.Nowherearetheserightstraded,althoughtheMurrayValleyWetlandsWorking
Group has used Natural Heritage Trust funds to buy temporary water entitlements to
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extend a ﬂooding event in the Murray River. Bell (2002) outlined a similar approach in
examining the prospects of a trading house for water entitlements and Bennett (2005)
looked at the prospects for private sector conservation enterprises to take a role in
purchasing rights for environmental ﬂows.
3.3 Bioeconomic modelling
Ofthethreesegmentsofenvironmentaleconomicsconsideredhere,bioeconomicmod-
elling has been the least controversial, perhaps because of its strong positivist focus.
What contention there has been arose at the policy end of the bioeconomic process.
In some ways, this has been mixed in with the controversy regarding NMV. For bioe-
conomic modelling to present policy-makers with a complete picture of biophysical
cause and effect relationships (of the ‘what if’ type scenarios) and the value these out-
comes hold for society, environmental impacts and their non-market values need to be
integrated.
Another technique that may be regarded as a means of estimating the impacts of
environmental resource use decisions is input–output analysis. Analysts can use this
technique to impose a ‘shock’ on an economy – usually at the regional level – and
estimate the resultant changes in expenditure patterns, including employment impacts.
For instance, the impacts on a regional economy resulting from changes to legislation
regardingtheclearingofvegetationcouldbeassessedusinginput–outputanalysis.This
process is a legitimate way to assess structural impacts of resource use changes and is
helpful to policy-makers developing measures to cope with such structural changes,
including infrastructure provision. However, it should not be mistaken as a tool for the
assessment of net impacts on social well-being. It is not based on concepts of producer
and consumer surplus and so conclusions of the type to be drawn from cost–beneﬁt
analysis cannot be made from input–output analyses.
4. Cop-outs
Some areas of environmental economics have either been neglected or ignored. This
is both good and bad news: good in that there are still ﬁelds available for active and
productive research, but bad in that policy advice to date has been inadequate and the
unchallenged areas may have limited research progress in other ﬁelds. Shortcomings
can be found in all three ﬁelds considered in the following subsections.
4.1 Non-market valuation
Although Australasian environmental economists have developed and applied NMV
techniques, nonetheless the integration of NMV into policy-making in both Australia
and New Zealand is still lacking. This short-fall has been due particularly to the
relatively high costs of undertaking stated preference techniques and perceptions of
the inaccuracies embedded in the techniques’ results. Opportunities for rent-seeking
behaviour in policy formation and implementation can arise. Without an appreciation
of the strength of the community’s values for environmental beneﬁts and costs, favour
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may be given to outcomes with readily estimated values. These will predominantly be
outcomes that yield marketed, extractive values. Alternatively, if policy-makers are left
to ‘judge’ the strength of environmental preferences, green lobby groups can mobilise
theirpoliticalforcestoswaythedecisiontowardenvironmentallyfavourableoutcomes.
Inbothcases,predictingwhichwayadecisionwillgorelatesmoretopoliticaleconomy
than resource use efﬁciency.
The perceived high cost of NMV has had several consequences. Where decision-
makers have been pressed to take into account non-market values, they have tended
towardtheuseofmarket-basedmethodsthatareinconsistentwithprinciplesofwelfare
economics. For instance, the costs associated with the draining and development of
a wetland may be estimated using the replacement cost method that involves the
calculation of the costs associated with the construction of an artiﬁcial wetland. This
method,althoughconvenienttoapply,isproblematicbecausetheartiﬁcialwetlandmay
not be a complete substitute for the original. Furthermore, the cost of the replacement
has no conceptual link to the net beneﬁt enjoyed from the original wetland.
Asimilarargumentappliestothepreventativeexpendituremethodofenvironmental
valuation that requires the estimation of costs associated with stopping the costs of
environmental damage from occurring. Applying either of these techniques has the
potential to deliver erroneous policy advice, an ironic consequence of attempts to
avoid errors arising from the use of stated preference techniques.
Another concern has been the increased application of the beneﬁt transfer process.
Beneﬁt transfer involves values previously estimated in some case study (the source)
being used (transferred) to another setting (the target). Although this practice reduces
thecostsofvalueestimation,itislimited.First,thecircumstancespresentinthesource
study have to resemble those present in the target. Second, the source study should
be a sound application of a valid technique. Both of these limitations require that
there is a database of robust NMV studies, covering a wide range of conditions, to
act as sources. It is, therefore, problematic in Australia and New Zealand for bene-
ﬁt transfer to be widely applied because of the paucity of source studies. Although
the NSW Environment Protection Authority maintains the ENVALUE database,
the number of studies it contains with results that are reliable and relevant to Aus-
tralasian conditions is limited. So, policy-makers using the beneﬁt transfer process
are free-riding on the publicly-available information on NMV. Without more agencies
supporting new applications, the problems associated with using beneﬁt transfer will
remain.
An additional factor that provides a barrier to the further development of NMV
techniques is the limitations of the biophysical science that is a prerequisite for their
application. For instance, in stated preference technique applications, respondents are
informed of the consequences of some particular resource management option and
their willingness to pay (or accept) is interrogated. In designing such questionnaires,
economists require the assistance of their biophysical science colleagues to predict the
consequences in terms of factors or attributes that are relevant to people. Frequently,
research on cause and effect relationships is unrelated to people-relevant attributes.
For instance, scientists may be able to predict biological oxygen demand changes in
watercausedbyreducednitrogenconcentrationsbuttheymaybeunabletopredictﬁsh
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populationsunderdifferentregimesofcattlegrazingalongstreambanks.Itisprobably
the latter impact that people are interested in. Hence, for stated preference techniques
to advance, biophysical science research has to be more orientated to policy questions
and people-relevant outcomes.
Other cop-outs revolve around more technical aspects of implementing NMV tech-
niques. Risk and uncertainty are important features of most environmental manage-
ment decisions but valuation studies have yet to attempt their incorporation. For
instance, people indicate their concerns that resource management decisions have ad-
verse impacts on endangered species. CM studies on that topic to date have used
attributes such as ‘the number of endangered species’. Yet the issue is more correctly
described in probability terms. Some health economics applications of stated prefer-
ence techniques address probabilistic outcomes but the same is yet to apply in ‘green’
environmental issues.
The dynamics of environmental values are also not well understood. Conjecture has
it that society has shifted its preferences toward environmental outcomes over time
but no valuation studies have been performed to test this hypothesis. Valuation studies
are important in this respect because they have the advantage of forcing individuals to
facetrade-offs that characterise choices and hence involve therevelationof preferences
against the benchmark of other available options.
Important groups within Australian and New Zealand communities have been ne-
glected in terms of having the strength of their environmental preferences estimated.
Onlyonestudyhasconsideredtheaboriginalcommunity’senvironmentalvalues(Rolfe
and Windle 2003) and no studies have investigated Maori preferences. Particular chal-
lengesfacesuchapplications,particularlywhensuchcommunitiesarenotfullyengaged
in the market economy.
There are also notable cop-outs among the revealed preference techniques. For
instance, no hedonic pricing studies for environmental goods and services have been
reported in the Society’s journals over the past two decades. Similarly, the production
function technique for inferring the values of ecosystem services as inputs into the
production of marketed commodities has not been applied. These techniques do not
suffer the burden of truthful response validation faced by stated preference techniques
because they use data observed from markets. Yet they remain neglected for a number
of reasons.
First,thehedonicpricingtechniquerequireslargeamountsofmarketdatatoenable
the estimation of the relationship between price and an environmental attribute and
the subsequent correlation between prices and the socioeconomic characteristics of
buyers. Furthermore, to develop sufﬁciently strong econometric models of these rela-
tionships, trading in the markets must be relatively thick. In many cases in Australia,
trading is too thin in markets where environmental attributes are relevant. Second, the
range of values that the hedonic pricing technique can estimate is limited. There must
be a related market to investigate and this implies that only use values will be available.
In the case of the production function technique, it is generally a lack of biophysical
data that limits its application. Before values can be estimated for ecosystem services
as the shadow prices of inputs into a production process, the relationship between
inputs and outputs needs to be deﬁned. Biophysical scientists are yet to provide sound
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have caused a dramatic increase in research resources being devoted to the analysis
of practical issues with institutional concerns at their heart. In particular, the use of
experimental economics has featured in the analysis of the consequences of alternative
institutional settings.
One element that has been neglected in this ﬁeld is the empirical assessment of
transaction costs under alternative institutional settings. Much has been made of the
cost-effectiveness advantages of market-based instruments, yet little is known about
the extent of transaction costs and their distribution between affected parties under
the market-based approach compared to the regulatory ‘command and control’ ap-
proach. The important factor to recognise is that alternative institutional systems all
have transaction costs, albeit of different types and different scales, as well as different
incentive structures. It is erroneous to choose between alternative institutional struc-
tures on the basis of their net social beneﬁts without including transaction costs. The
distributional issue is interesting in the contemplation of this oversight. For instance,
by moving from a regulatory approach to a market-based instrument approach, gov-
ernments release a degree of control over the environment. Instead of dictating which
supplier provides environmental services and how much, the government may only set
the overall level of services required. This has cost-efﬁciency advantages but it also
changes the transaction cost burden. Individual suppliers take on the task of deter-
mining the optimal mix of suppliers by operating in a new market. This involves them
incurring the transaction costs associated with developing the required knowledge to
work in that market. The costs formerly born by the government in determining the
mix of suppliers are transferred.
A further omission from the institutional economics ﬁeld is the integration of the
demand for environmental goods and services into resource allocation mechanisms.
The default position remains a reliance on the state to estimate the extent of demand
and to mobilise resources from consolidated revenue to see that demand realised.
Demand-revealing institutional structures remain elusive for environmental goods
and services with strong public-good characteristics. Even in the absence of such
institutional arrangements, the focus on supply-side efﬁciency through market-based
instruments has meant that non-market values have not been used to estimate the
amounts of public funds to be devoted to purchasing ‘environmental rights’. Rather
‘ecologicalindices’havebeenused,asinthecaseoftheBushTenderscheme,toindicate
what features are valuable to society. The potential is for such indices to reﬂect what is
valuable to the ecologists who devise them rather than the broader public.
4.3 Bioeconomic modelling
The inadequacies in bioeconomic modelling have largely concerned the scope of the
analyses. Early examples related ecological conditions to costs imposed on society.
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Progress has seen increasing complexity of the costing models used. The tendency has
been for researchers to use their cost-based work to draw policy conclusions or at least
make statements regarding the incentives facing the parties.
Theomissionisinconsideringthebeneﬁtsideoftheissue.Tworeasonsareapparent.
First, the science linking alternative management actions with environmental outcome
attributes that are valued by society has been lacking. Second, the valuation of these
outcomes has been problematic.
Without addressing these omissions, the potential for bioeconomic modelling is
restricted from a policy perspective. Similarly, its prospects will be restricted if it moves
to a framework of integrating beneﬁts and costs that fails to adhere to the basic
principles of welfare economics. The implication is that mechanisms such as MCA,
that are not soundly founded, should not be taken as a ‘short-cut’ to policy relevance.
Unless beneﬁt–cost principles are integrated into bioeconomic modelling, researchers
should be circumspect in their policy recommendations.
5. Conclusions
Much has been achieved in Australasian environmental economics over the past two
decades. Much is yet to be done. NMV remains a point of conﬂict both within and
outside the profession and an area of neglect. Perhaps because of its controversial
nature, few economists want to risk basing their professional careers in this ﬁeld.
There are few people well-trained to do advanced research in NMV in Australasia.
For NMV to reach a point where environmental managers and policy-makers have
conﬁdence in its results, more studies will need to be performed. The evolutionary
process required to see this development requires more experimentation. This will
require growth in both the willingness of agencies – policy, management and research
– to fund studies and the capacity of research bodies inside and outside government
to do those studies.
A growth in capacity could be achieved simultaneously with greater experimenta-
tion through the funding of projects including training components and with longer
time lines than those usually associated with the development of policy inputs. If these
projects were selected to ﬁll voids identiﬁed in databases such as ENVALUE, then
they would also provide contributions to the stock of studies suitable for use in beneﬁt
transfer exercises. Speciﬁc technical issues including the integration of risk and uncer-
tainty should be addressed in these applications. Replication of studies performed in
the past would provide indications of changing environmental preferences. Extensions
to involve aboriginal people would also add to the richness and relevance of the data
on environmental preferences for policy-making.
Although stated preference NMV techniques have received most of the attention of
critics,andhencemayberegardedasbeinginmostneedforevolutionarydevelopment,
the neglect of revealed preference techniques should also be addressed. In particular,
the hedonic pricing and production function methods deserve greater attention.
More relevant biophysical science is a prerequisite for improved NMV (especially
stated preference techniques and the production function method) and bioeconomic
modelling. For this situation to improve there needs to be a better recognition on
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the part of those funding policy relevant research that bridges have to be constructed
between the disciplines and that both biophysical science and economics research
require time.
The current developments in institutional design and application, including the use
of experimental economics techniques, will go far in addressing the shortcomings in
that ﬁeld. Inclusion of the analysis of transaction costs will be important to ensure
completeness in developing policy advice. Given that transaction costs have been
found to account for more than half of all the costs of producing and distributing the
national product in modern market economies (North 1990), their omission from the
development of extensions to the market to encompass environmental resources could
be serious.
In integrating the inputs of different aspects of environmental economics, the temp-
tation for researchers and policy-advisers is to avoid elements of a complete analysis
that are costly or controversial. Avoidance strategies such as MCA and input–output
analysis involve departures from the rigour of welfare economics. The consequence
is that the problems avoided by short-cut analysis result in different and often more
intractable problems. For instance, using MCA requires the estimation of ‘weights’ for
all the criteria, both market and non-market. The alternative faces the same problems
of NMV techniques whether the weights are estimated through recourse to ‘experts’
or by means of a ‘citizens’ jury’ approach. But the use of these alternatives brings
additional issues such as rent-seeking behaviour. Put simply, the shortcuts are more
problematic than the full analysis but many of their problems are not as well or as
widely understood as those facing the full analysis.
The progress made in tackling environmental economics over the past 20years
has been displayed in the journals of this Society. However, the effectiveness of the
Australian and New Zealand profession in providing leadership in environmental eco-
nomics across the Asia Paciﬁc region has been limited in comparison to that achieved
by Australasian agricultural economists. That may well be a function of the stage
of development of our regional neighbours. However, as economic development pro-
gresses, attention will turn increasingly toward environmental management issues. A
leadership role for Australian and New Zealand environmental economists is apparent
and could potentially be fostered by this Society.
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